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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Orlando Laureano challenges the legality of his sentence in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming the District Court
erred by assigning him an additional criminal history point for a prior conviction under 75
Pa. C.S. § 3809, which prohibits possession of an open alcoholic container or consumption
of a controlled substance or alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle on a Commonwealth
highway.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and
will affirm.  
I.
The District Court added one criminal history point to Laureano’s sentencing
guidelines calculation for a prior, unrelated October 21, 2003 conviction under 75 Pa. C.S.
§ 3809, wherein Laureano had pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while possessing an
open 22-ounce bottle of “Silver Thunder” malt liquor.  Laureano’s sentence for that
conviction was a fine and costs totaling $217.  On appeal, he argues that 75 Pa. C.S. § 3809
is, or is sufficiently similar to, a minor traffic infraction, public intoxication, or a local
ordinance violation, such that it must be excluded from his guidelines calculation pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).
II.
3“The courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for unreasonableness,”  United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005), and we review a district
court’s legal interpretation of the now-advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines de novo.
See, e.g., United States v. Irwin, 369 F.3d 284, 285 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).  Laureano and the
government agree, correctly, that he timely objected to the additional criminal history point
both at the time of his presentence report and at the time of his sentencing.  Accordingly,
Laureano properly preserved the issue on appeal.
III.
We begin with U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), which provides a default rule in pertinent part:
(c) Sentences Counted and Excluded
 
. . . . Sentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted,
except as follows:
(1)  Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses
similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted
only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of at least one
year or the term of imprisonment was at least thirty days, or (B)
the prior offense was similar to an instant offense:
. . . 
Local ordinance violations (excluding local ordinance
violations that are also criminal offenses under state law)
. . .
(2) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses
similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are never
counted:
. . .
Minor traffic infractions (e.g., speeding)
Public intoxication
. . .
4U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).  Next, although not cited by either party in their respective briefs, we
turn to our decision in United States v. Elmore, 108 F.3d 23 (3d Cir. 1997).  In that §
4A1.2(c) case, we declined an invitation to “inquire into ‘all possible factors of similarity[]’
in determining whether an unlisted offense is ‘similar’ to a listed offense for the purposes of
Guidelines section 4A1.2(c)(1).”  Elmore, 108 F.3d at 27 (citation omitted).  Instead, we
adopted the approach of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, holding the proper
methodology for analyzing § 4.A1.2(c) challenges should “focus only upon the elements of
the offenses as statutorily defined.”  Id.; see also United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 762-
63 (1st Cir. 1990).  In so holding, we also rejected the argument that we “must look to the
defendant’s actual conduct to determine whether it constituted an excluded offense.”
Elmore, 108 F.3d at 26.   
With both § 4A1.2(c) and Elmore in mind, the question whether 75 Pa. C.S. § 3809
is excludable under one of the exceptions to § 4A1.2(c)’s default rule resolves itself as
follows.  Here, as a threshold matter, § 4A1.2(c)(1)(A) is plainly inapplicable, as Laureano
was neither imprisoned nor placed on probation pursuant to his conviction under § 3809.
The only issue, then, is whether § 3809 is sufficiently similar to one of the enumerated
offenses under subsections (c)(1) or (c)(2) to warrant exclusion. 
75 Pa. C.S. § 3809 states in pertinent part:
(a)  General rule.– . . . [A]n individual who is an operator or an
occupant in a motor vehicle may not be in possession of an open
alcoholic beverage container or consume a controlled substance
as defined in . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and
       Under Pennsylvania law, an offense is a summary offense if “(1) [i]t is so designated1
in this title, or in a statute other than this title; or (2) [i]f a person convicted thereof may
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum which is not more than 90 days.” 
18 Pa. C.S. § 106(c).  However, 75 Pa. C.S. § 6502(c), which describes penalties under
the Vehicle Code, specifically states that Title 18 is inapplicable “insofar as it relates to
fines and imprisonment for convictions of summary offenses.”  Thus, under the Vehicle
Code, an open container violation is punishable by a fine, but not imprisonment.
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Cosmetic Act, or an alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle while
the motor vehicle is located on a highway in this
Commonwealth.
. . .
(c)  Penalty.–An individual who violates this section commits a
summary offense.
75 Pa. C.S. § 3809.   1
While we are not unmindful that the criminal history point at issue here represented
to Laureano the difference between being subject to a guideline range of 24 to 30 months
(with the additional point) instead of 18 to 24 months (without), the plain language of these
statutory provisions compels us to conclude that the District Court did not err in reading §
4A1.2(c) and 75 Pa. C.S. § 3809 as it did.  Under § 4A1.2(c)’s default rule, the past
conviction is to be counted absent grounds for exclusion, and we agree with the government
that such grounds are lacking with respect to § 3809.  
As to Laureano’s public intoxication contention, we find that our methodology as
articulated in Elmore compels our conclusion.  Pennsylvania’s public intoxication statute, 18
Pa.C.S. § 5505, states in pertinent part:
§ 5505. Public drunkenness and similar misconduct
A person is guilty of a summary offense if he appears in any
6public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance . . . to the degree that he may endanger
himself or other persons . . . or annoy persons in his vicinity.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5505.  As set forth above, § 3809, in contrast, states in pertinent part:
. . . [A]n individual who is an operator or an occupant in a motor
vehicle may not be in possession of an open alcoholic beverage
container or consume a controlled substance . . . or an alcoholic
beverage in a motor vehicle while the motor vehicle is located
on a highway in this Commonwealth.
 
Plainly, the elements of these offenses are dissimilar.  Section 5505 requires presence in a
“public place”; § 3809 requires presence in a “motor vehicle.”  Section 5505 requires a
“manifest[]” showing that one is “under the influence”; § 3809 requires only a showing of
possession or consumption.  Section 5505 requires “endanger[ment]” or “annoy[ance]”; §
3809 does not.  Given the dissimilarity of § 3809 and § 5505, we reject Laureano’s public
intoxication argument.
Although Elmore’s element-by-element approach fits neatly when we consider
whether Laureano’s prior conviction is similar to public intoxication, Elmore’s analysis is
not as easily applied to the items listed in § 4A1.2(c).  Local ordinance violations are not
specific offenses and do not have “elements.”  Rather, they are a category of offenses.  
That said, a definitional approach, which we apply to Laureano’s local ordinance
argument, is nonetheless consistent with Elmore.  As to Laureano’s local ordinance
contention, we observe that the presence of a motor vehicle “on a highway in this
Commonwealth” is one of § 3809's three elements.  Because § 3809 reaches all of the
highways of the Commonwealth, the provision is, by virtue of its element of geographic
scope, fundamentally unlike a local ordinance.  
        Laureano asserted at argument that § 3809 is also similar to a “[m]inor traffic2
infraction[].”  § 4A1.2(c)(2).  Review of Laureano’s brief confirms the argument is
waived.  See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well
settled that an appellant's failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  Even were this not so, our review would be
for plain error, since Laureano did not raise this argument below.  See Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b).  Because we have not previously spoken on this issue, the District Court did not
plainly err.  See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(error is plain only where proper course is “clear under current law”) (quoting United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
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Any doubt as to this dissimilarity is removed, we believe, upon observation of  Section
3809’s place of codification.  Section 3809 resides not in Chapter 33 of Pennsylvania’s
Vehicle Code, which is entitled “Rules of the Road in General,” but rather in Chapter 38 of
that Code, entitled “Driving After Imbibing Alcohol or Utilizing Drugs.”  While this does
not speak directly to § 3809's elements vis-a-vis Laureano’s claim that § 3809 is merely a
local ordinance by another name, the legislature’s placement of the statute in Chapter 38
strongly suggests its intent to classify the offense as something more than a violation of a
local ordinance — not only with respect to the risk of danger posed by the prohibited
conduct, which is something we may not strictly consider under Elmore — but also as to the
legislature’s desired geographic scope for § 3809.  This is because 75 Pa.C.S. § 3101(b)
makes clear that all of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 38 cannot be considered local.
See id. (stating that all “[s]erious traffic offenses” including those in “Chapter 38 relating to
driving after imbibing alcohol or utilizing drugs[] shall apply upon highways and trafficways
throughout this Commonwealth”) (emphasis added).  Given both § 3809's elements as well
as its codification grouping, we reject Laureano’s local ordinance argument as well.2
Accordingly, we will affirm the March 28, 2005 sentence of the District Court.
